in ghetto neighborhoods flocked to basketball courts as one of their only options for recreation. They soon achieved prominence: New York City's "public, private and even Catholic universities in the 1930s and '40s had starting lineups that were overwhelmingly Jewish" (p. 116).

My major criticism of the book is that it could have incorporated quotations and citations from more numerous and up-to-date sources, especially with regard to the history of Jewish communal life and the experience of Jews from the former Soviet Union. Several excellent studies on these topics have been published in the last decade, and their inclusion would have enriched this volume. Nevertheless, in a book with with a broad perspective, this flaw is a minor one.

In the Golden Land: A Century of Russian and Soviet Jewish Immigration in America is a lively and well-written book that will appeal to a general readership as well as to specialists in Jewish and ethnic studies. It is rich in quantitative data as well as entertaining anecdotes and life histories.


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Susan Strange is a prominent British international relations scholar, known for her commitment to interdisciplinary scholarship and her iconoclastic views. The issue of states and sovereignty in the contemporary era of globalization is vitally important, and of great interest to a broad range of scholars. The argument is very provocative. But as a comparative sociologist, I found this book deeply disappointing.

Strange's argument is not novel, but unequivocal: Recent fundamental changes in the global economy make world markets and transnational corporate players more powerful than nation states. The worldwide trend is toward privatization and antistatism. Although Strange acknowledges that this may create certain types of enduring polarization and inequality (with countries like Rwanda or Sri Lanka "left behind" and "no-go areas in big unruly cities like Los Angeles and Belfast" insecure for people or investments), generally it is all for the good, since markets operate better when capital has a freer hand. Strange claims that transnational investment has actually redistributed wealth from rich to poor countries, and that corporate managers will do a better job negotiating labor relations now that governments no longer have the power to meddle on behalf of unions. The dislocation and economic pain borne by industrial workers in affluent countries may provoke "fierce resistance." But in Strange's neoliberal world, global shifts are unstoppable and popular resistance doomed to fail. Because market forces will be increasingly unaccountable to states, democracy is apt to decline. (Not to worry: This allows individuals to respond to "multiple, diffused authority" instead of ponderous states!)

Although many readers may find it troubling, this vision is completely consistent with mainstream images of "globalization" (especially those of the business press), which stress the inevitability of market ascendency and state decline. But most students of contemporary international political economy (including many sociologists) would find it quite controversial. A persuasive argument would require a tightly argued volume, addressing relevant literatures and marshaling convincing empirical evidence.

Strange has not written that book here. The volume begins with five chapters of "Theoretical Foundations" before it moves on to "Some Empirical Evidence"—but the link between the conceptual claims and the vignettes on emerging global institutions is tenuous. The early theoretical chapters offer assertions, but little documentation, about "the retreat of the state" and speculations about how and why this has come about. So I expected systematic evidence in the later chapters, which highlight the growing transnational roles of telecommunications, organized crime, insurance, accounting, industry cartels, and international
bureaucracy. Instead, despite some interesting insights here, much of the material is only tangentially related to "the decline of states" thesis, while other information from these "case studies" appears to openly contradict it! One of my biggest disappointments, as a reviewer for CS, is the author's lack of attention to sociological work. Although Strange claims to write for a general readership and often attacks generic "social science," her real target is a group of U.S.-based "international relations" theorists. She sees an implicit bias in their analysis toward U.S. interests and a tendency to ignore many key nonpolitical institutions. She may be right. (Ditto, on her devastating critique of "rational choice" approaches.) But it is truly unfortunate that an author arguing for "interdisciplinary" work ignores so much relevant literature in history, sociology, geography, and the like. (In one revealing passage, she complains that as a scholar of international political economy she has been "shot at from both sides—by the political scientists and the economists.") Important global political economy research done by sociologists is ignored: This book discusses theories of the contemporary world system without citing Immanuel Wallerstein or Giovanni Arrighi, new patterns of global finance without mentioning Saskia Sassen, and world industrial networks without reference to the burgeoning literature on "global commodity chains." Idiosyncratic definitions of "structural" and "relational" power, and a discussion of modern professions that cites a book written in 1933 but no recent research, testify to a stunning lack of basic sociological literacy. While Strange does not always seem clear about her intended audience, it is safe to say that it is not readers of this journal. More's the pity: A little sociological imagination could only have helped!


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The study of social movements did not become a major subdivision of sociology until the second half of this century. Most earlier writers condemned them as socially pathological and the individual participants as psychologically abnormal. Herbert Blumer, however, regarded both movements and members as creative, not merely destructive. As both sociologist and social psychologist he nourished the guttering flame of interest. After 1950, several of his students became instrumental in developing sufficient interest in social movements and collective behavior to lead, eventually, to the formation of a section in the American Sociological Association.

Even as this section emerged, a controversy arose: Some sociologists wished to separate social movements from collective behavior. Movements were said to engage in "collective action." Various earlier approaches were attacked as "classical theories," and their proponents charged with regarding social movements as destructive events arising from the breakdown of functional societies that have developed structural strain, not as rational protests against powerful governments or elites. They were accused of treating the members as irrational, not as participants with politically justified motives who were making rational choices.

Theories emerged emphasizing structural, political, and economic variables rather than individual motives such as deprivation, real or relative, fear, or frustration. Resource-mobilization and political-process theories, the free-rider dilemma, and rational choice became fashionable. Reacting primarily to these very sociological, sometimes deterministic approaches, Bert Klandermans seeks to bring individuals—and thus social psychology—back in.

He reminds us that social movements are composed of individuals, although they share collective goals and a collective identity. They are heterogeneous, however, and participants